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How should we conduct ourselves? Critical Realism and Aristotelian 
Teleology: A framework for the development of virtues in pedagogy 
and curriculum. 
Abstract: 
Faced with the marketization of higher education in England, pedagogy is under 
pressure in ways that often undermine lecturers’ deeply held values. For instance, this 
pressure results in the reduction of significant aspects of teaching to narrow metrics and 
requires universities to operate within intrusive structures that subordinate their 
pedagogical aims to profit-orientated objectives. In this paper, I analyse the way that 
people can preserve their agency in this pedagogical context. I guide my analysis with a 
framework that combines critical realism with Aristotelian virtue ethics and 
MacIntyre’s ideas of qualities within human practices. I suggest the kinds of qualities 
that might assist faculty to preserve and advance rich pedagogical projects in the current 
circumstances. Finally, I use a critical realist morphogenetic approach to argue that 
people may be able to resist losing their way when faced with ubiquitous performativity 
regimes. 
Keywords: Critical realism; Aristotle; virtue ethics; performativity; curriculum; 
pedagogy; morphogenetic interactions; structures; agency; MacIntyre; 
Reflexivity. 
Introduction 
In the current circumstances in Higher Education in England, regimes of 
performativity (Ball 2012, Lyotard 1984) are undermining the agency of 
lecturers in the pedagogical process (Shore and Wright 1999). Teachers in 
higher education find themselves following paths that contradict their 
professional experience and common sense and often divert them from 
deeply held values (Collini 2018, Sharar 2016). As Sayer (2011) claims, an 
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integral aspect of human agency is reflected in how we choose to conduct 
ourselves. In this paper I argue that neither passively following the dictat of 
governmental and institutional agencies around pedagogy (Ramsden 1991), 
nor simply arguing for better metrics (Hayes 2017) to measure ‘good 
teaching’ via empiricist methods, can lead to ‘excellence’ in teaching. 
Instead, I advocate an Aristotelean virtue-based approach to ethics – as 
interpreted by MacIntyre (2007) – to identify the qualities needed by faculty 
to defend and develop their pedagogical work. I combine this with a critical 
realist analysis of morphogenetic structure-agency interactions to suggest a 
possible way to develop pedagogical approaches and curricula within current 
higher education contexts in England. 
I begin with a brief discussion of approaches to ethical issues. I follow this 
with an introduction to the process of market creation within the higher 
education system in England in which I outline the effect of marketization 
on the habitual actions of faculty, and through this on pedagogy. Next, I give 
a description of Aristotle’s teleology and his virtue ethics, both highlighting 
their compatibility with critical realism, and using them to understand the 
complexity and potential richness of pedagogical endeavours which may be 
disappearing in current conditions. I then provide an outline of MacIntyre’s 
ideas on human practices and conceptualise pedagogy in higher education  
as a modern-day practice in which agents need various qualities in order to 
teach in changing contexts. However, these qualities are undermined by 
pressures to remain passive in the light of market-led reforms. Finally, I 
introduce Archer’s (2007b) morphogenetic approach as a possible solution 
to the problems facing faculty who must be reflexive if they are to further 
their pedagogic projects. I illustrate my argument with anonymised 
experiences of faculty in universities in England drawn from my earlier 
research (Sharar 2016).  
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Approaches to ethics: the question of what is ‘good’ 
It is possible to divide approaches to ethics into three categories: 
deontological, consequentialist and virtue-based. Deontological, or rule-
based approaches to ethics evaluate actions in terms of whether they are 
inherently fulfilling a duty or contain the quality of ‘goodness’ (Nagel 1987, 
Kant 1964, Rawls 1999).  This approach has been described as ‘Ethics based 
on the notion of a duty, or what is right, or rights’ (Blackburn 2005, 94). 
Consequentialist approaches to ethics evaluate the consequences of an action 
(Bentham 1948). They have been described as ‘the view that the value of an 
action derives entirely from the value of its consequences’ (Blackburn 2005, 
94). Both these approaches, which are not mutually exclusive, tend to ignore 
the way that performing certain actions affects the agents. By contrast, 
virtue-based (Aristotelian) ethics emphasises the ways that agents change 
through their actions. In this approach, the agents’ ultimate aims are 
determined through an internal principle of change within our human 
existence as rational beings with needs for nourishment, growth, movement 
and rest, as well as intellectual needs to think and learn (Johnson 2008). It is 
in the course of actualising such internal potentials that humans develop the 
ability to act judiciously in different and changing circumstances. According 
to virtue ethics, the choices facing teachers or students, as rational animals 
with intellectual and social needs are not about whether to teach or learn, but 
how to do so. Virtuous activity leads to the development of virtues and a 
state of happiness or Eudemonia. According to MacIntyre: 
Human beings, like the members of all other species, have a specific nature; and 
that nature is such that they have certain aims and goals, such that they move by 
nature towards a specific telos. The good is defined in terms of their specific 
characteristics (2007, 148). 
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In this paper, I use virtue-based ethics to claim that lecturers’ habitual daily 
activities can have profound effects on themselves, their students and their 
pedagogical practices. Drawing upon Archer’s (2003) formulation of 
personal properties and powers, I detail the way that acting in the physical 
world changes our bodies to give us emergent physical powers; acting in the 
social world further develops emergent powers for social interaction; while 
acting in the cultural and linguistic world further develops our emergent 
powers in this area (Sharar 2016). In the process, not only do humans 
develop new powers, they learn how to use them judiciously in different 
contexts and to different extents as appropriate. Habitual activities play a part 
in this process and habits formed due to the pressures of performativity can 
interfere with our capacity to successfully carry out pedagogical work. The 
imposition of regimes of marketisation and managerialism on faculty engage 
them in just such habitual activities (Broadbent 2007). Burrows points out 
that: Academic value is, essentially, becoming monetized, and as this 
happens academic values are becoming transformed (2012, 368). That is, 
the values of academia are becoming the values of marketisation. However, 
before I argue against the dogma that there is no alternative to this situation 
– which, if accepted, leaves no room for reflexive agency – I ask, ‘How has 
this situation come to pass?’. Therefore, in the next section I describe how 
the higher education sector in England has become marketised. A similar 
process of marketization has occurred in several other countries, such as  the 
USA (Lipman 2013) and Australia (Livock  2018), As part of a global trend 
to neo-liberalism (Sharar 2016). 
Privatisation and market creation in English Higher Education 
Burrows (2012) argues that what is deemed to be good teaching is coming 
to be contested in Higher Education in England. No longer are decisions 
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about pedagogy left to the discretion of lecturers to exercise their experience, 
their knowledge of their students, the contextual factors or even the demands 
of their discipline. Instead decisions are based on metrics, which reduce, 
quantify and measure pedagogy (Collini (2018). The purpose of the metrics 
is supposedly to simplify the complexities of pedagogical interactions for 
measurement and comparison. They are part of a larger mechanism to pose 
the market as a ‘magical’ solution (Ball 1998, 121) to various perceived 
deficits in education. In such circumstances faculty find their ability to 
control their pedagogical aims increasingly curtailed. 
Successive governments in England have had the policy of opening national 
education markets to private providers. Explicitly stating this as one of its 
key objectives the Department of Trade and Industry, as far back as 2006, 
said: The department has a key role in establishing the UK competition 
policy framework and promoting the benefits of market liberalisation in the 
EU and globally… (Department of Trade and Industry 2006, 18) 
A £449 million cut in state funding for universities was announced as early 
as February 2010.  As a result 250,000 UK student places and 15,000 
university posts were lost. In 2014, the government cut another £125 million 
from the higher education sector (Morgan 2014). Since then, state funding 
has continued to be reduced each year. The UK Minister of State for 
Universities and Science, explicitly embraced market production in the form 
of privatisation of higher education in 2011 stating. 
Currently, one of the barriers to alternative providers is the teaching grant we pay 
to publically funded HEIs [Higher Education Institutions]. This enables HEIs to 
charge fees at a level that private providers could not match……..Our funding 
reforms will remove this barrier, because all HEIs will –in future- receive most of 
their income from students via fees. This reform, of itself, opens up the system 
(Willetts, 2011) cited in (Brown and Carasso 2013, 29). 
7 
 
The student loans system, combined with withdrawal of state funding, acted 
as a generative mechanism to bring an element of artificial competition into 
higher education. It drove higher education institutions to try to dispense 
with government support (Henkel 2007). Although money for student loans 
still came from the state, underwritten by the taxpayer, state funding for the 
higher education sector was totally withdrawn in December 2010 (Collini 
2018) causing universities to compete for students and resources. At the 
same time a shift towards market governance emerged in the higher 
education sector (Henkel 2007). Universities’ recruitment was controlled by 
the government who stipulated the number of students that each institution 
could recruit as well as entrance qualifications and numbers per discipline 
(Brown and Carasso 2013). This mechanism applied to all publically-funded 
universities. Universities reacted, depending on their economic health, status 
and institutional culture. Examples of responses ranged from one university 
misreporting student drop out figures (Brown 2010), to universities cutting 
unprofitable courses, such as philosophy (Segal 2010). Another emergent 
phenomenon was that inequalities in the take-up of higher education actually 
increased over the period of its massification (Blanden and Machin 2004). 
Since then student fees have increased to an average of £9,000 per year in 
2014 and have reached £9,250 a year in England in 2018 exacerbating further 
inequalities. In the wake of marketization, education has become more 
accessible to those who can pay (Tilak 2011), both on a national and on a 
global scale (Ball and Youdell 2007) making universities increasingly 
concerned with their image in a competitive market.  
As far back as 2007, Gordon Brown’s speech at the Lord Mayor’s banquet 
for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London had already explicitly 
linked education with markets: 
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Only with investment in education can open markets, free trade and flexibility 
succeed. And the prize is enormous. If we can show people that by equipping 
themselves for the future they can be the winners not losers in globalisation, 
beneficiaries of this era of fast moving change, then people will welcome open, 
flexible, free trade and pro-competition economies as an emancipating force 
(Brown 2007) cited in (Grant 2009, xv). 
 
Such emphasis on markets as an emancipating force paved the way for 
variants of micro human-capital theories of education to be adopted in 
developing education policy. Barnett (1999) claims that the 1997 Dearing 
report was an attempt to reposition universities as facilitators of economic 
regeneration. This report (Dearing 1997), though advocating the need for 
education to be life enriching and desirable in its own right, linked it to 
economic growth, international competitiveness, new technology and 
standards and accountability on the basis of ‘value for money’. This set the 
scene for shifting the aims and preoccupations of the university in England. 
Ball elaborates the commodification of education in general, claiming that 
‘market solutions’ are being promoted as solutions to ‘entrenched problems 
of educational development’. State funding was withdrawn and is being 
replaced with private funding arrangements throughout the university sector 
through what Ball calls the:…roll-back and roll-out activities of neo-
liberalism, that is in both destabilising welfare policies and welfare thinning 
and creating new spaces for market activity and fostering consent around 
ideas of choice and market freedom... (Ball 2012, 26) 
Legislative impetus for these ‘roll-back and roll-out activities’ was provided 
by the Prime Minister’s Initiative in International Education, announced in 
(2010) by the Department for Children, Schools and Families. Another 
driver was the need for curriculum development, which is easily and cheaply 
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exported, as universities looked towards this market. Furthermore, the  
British governments were interested in, not only the domestic education 
market, but the global one too (Clark 2006). According to a press release in 
2010, announcing the prime minister’s initiative, the aim was to: ‘Maintain 
the UK's position in major education markets….’ and ‘….to help secure the 
UK's position as a leader in international education’ (Department for 
Children Schools and Families 2010, 1-3). 
The Department for Children, Schools and Families (ibid) disclosed that this 
initiative was heavily supported by ‘Corporate Champions’ – British 
Petroleum, British Aerospace Systems, GlaxoSmithKline and Shell – each 
prepared to give a million pounds to the initiatives. Overall, the project of 
the neo-liberal, profit-driven advancement of the UK into the global 
education market was funded by £27 million, taken from the UK 
government, the British Council and business. £2 million of this money was 
used to develop the UK’s education markets in Russia, £4 million in China, 
£3 million in Africa and £7.5 million in India (the Indian Tata group’s 
research initiative).  
This encroachment of private interests into universities violates one of the 
fundamental principles of the 1988 Magna Charta Universitatum, created in 
Bologna on the 900th anniversary of the first European University, and 
signed by 500 rectors of universities across the world: 
The university is an autonomous institution at the heart of societies, differently 
organised because of geography and historical heritage; it produces, examines, 
appraises and hands down culture by research and teaching. To meet the needs of 
the world around it, its research and teaching must be morally and intellectually 
independent of all political authority and economic power (Magna Charta 
Observatory 1988, 1). 
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The market: A generative mechanism affecting pedagogy in Higher 
Education 
The language of market competitiveness filters down through university 
strategic plans and marketing materials right to the course team or 
academic group level affecting pedagogical decisions (Sharar 2016). It 
shifts the preoccupations of individual faculty members from pedagogical 
issues to marketing and financing issues Brown and Carasso claim that this 
is far from a free market. Those designated as consumers, in other words 
students, cannot access honest information to make free choices, neither do 
HE institutions  or faculties within them operate as free agents (Brown and 
Carasso 2013).  
The use of marketized language within faculty meetings also constitutes a 
move to win staff over to compliance with a market approach (Garvin 
2012). In previous research (Sharar 2016), I have presented detailed 
accounts of the structure/agency morphogenetic interactions within faculty 
meetings where this mechanism acts as a structure and where staff struggle 
to change it. Shelley (2005) has noted that marketisation in the UK higher 
education sector has led faculty to accept a culture of competition in 
academe. Lecturers find themselves drawn into regimes of self-monitoring 
and competition with peers and other faculties, driven to manage their own 
performance against metrics and market demands as perceived by 
managers in their institutions (Hayes 2017). Student feedback 
questionnaires asking students to rate their lecturers in various superficial 
ways have become mandatory. Despite widespread understanding of the 
unsuitability of these requirements – in terms of supporting authentic 
learning – they remain entrenched (Collini 2018). The mechanisms by 
which the marketized practices are maintained can be explained in terms of 
regimes of performativity (Lyotard 1984). These systems of regimentation 
and control in higher education have been analysed by Ball (2012) and 
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described in anthropological detail by Shore and Roberts (1993). The latter 
claim that reform of education has created a centralisation of power and 
authority. This has consisted of: streamlining management structures; 
redefining lecturers' responsibilities; ‘rationalising’ teaching resources; and 
appraising and auditing staff performance using statistical indices, to 
allocate funding. Shore and Wright (1999, 563) go on to claim that the 
audit culture arising from neo-liberal forms of governance in higher 
education has ‘systematically reconfigured the university sector as a docile 
auditable body’. 
In 2016, the Teaching Excellence Framework was announced by the UK 
government. This consists of a series of metrics on the basis of which 
university teaching is to be evaluated. Frankham (2017) details ways in 
which universities’ preoccupation with metrics on student employability is 
distorting the ways in which teaching and the curriculum itself is being 
organised. Bhaskar et al (2017, 93) state that, ‘there is little evidence that 
programmes that incentivize narrow, tick-box behaviour … are beneficial’. 
Despite such critiques. For a thorough critical realist refutation of such 
empiricist methods to evaluate pedagogy see Scott (2014) there is increasing 
pressure on lecturers to score highly on metrics, which are often ill-
conceived and at best irrelevant to pedagogy and often detrimental to the 
interests of both faculty and students. According to Clegg (2010, 31) the shift 
to metric evaluation subtly, and sometimes not so subtly – in the case of 
research selectivity – changes the faculty’s teaching and research practice 
within higher education. In doing so, the shift also changes the conditions 
for critique and critical work, making both intellectual and practical 
intervention more difficult. She states: 
The discursive location of these newer practices of audit and evidence are 
positioned in relationship to the powerful and policy makers who increasingly set 
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the terms of debate about what is useful knowledge, what is open to ethical 
scrutiny and what is excluded, and who is held accountable and in what ways. 
(Clegg 2010, 31). 
It is these newer practices that push faculty into new habitual actions to 
comply and accommodate them, especially if they feel that there is no 
alternative. According to Burrows, ‘Not only are we being publically judged 
and ranked but we are also being encouraged to reorient our pedagogical 
practices towards the preferences, tastes and mores of an ever more 
consumerist student audience’ (2012, 367). 
In the above section I have outlined the conditions in which faculty in 
English Higher Education are trying to teach. The questions to ask are: What 
is happening to pedagogy and what is becoming absent from pedagogical 
projects faculty are pursuing? What are the spaces for agential action? What 
can be done within these circumstances? Clegg (2008) details resistance to 
these conditions in her work on academic identities. Crucial to such 
resistance are what Archer calls human beings’ reflexive capacities, which 
include their ability to design (and redesign) many of the projects they 
pursue. She states that: 
If we are to survive and thrive, we have to be practitioners, and the definition of a 
successful practice is the realisation of a particular project in the relevant part of 
the environment (Archer 2007a, 7).  
Archer goes on to point out that this reflexive ability gives humans the power 
to be ‘active agents’, rather than ‘passive agents’ to whom things simply 
happen (Archer 2007a, 6). It is in this reflexive ability that the way forward 
in current circumstances may be sought. To follow this point further the next 
section outlines Aristotle’s ideas on teleology and virtues.  
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Aristotelian teleology- Striving towards a goal 
Aristotle assumes that all natural entities, including living things, contain an 
internal principle of change which moves them towards what is intrinsically 
good for them (Johnson 2008). In Aristotle’s view the human soul has what 
he called potentialities or faculties to meet its needs for nourishment, growth, 
movement and rest as well as for perception and intellect. These he called its 
‘nutritive, perceptive, desiderative, locomotive and intellective’ faculties 
(Aristotle 1986, De Anima Book ll 414a41). In much the same way as critical 
realism conceptualises the world as having a stratified ontology, Aristotle 
postulates a stratification within the human soul. Exercise of human 
faculties, at biological, social, intellectual levels involves actualising 
inherent potentials at each level. These potentials or faculties are possessed, 
as part of the ontology of humans as rational animals. 
In critical realist terms Bhaskar calls such an emergence of agency in living 
things ‘synchronic emergent causal powers materialism’. According to him 
we can:  
credit intentional embodied agency with distinct (emergent) causal powers from 
the biological matter out of which agents were formed, on which they are capable 
of reacting back (and must, precisely as materially embodied causally efficacious 
agents, do so, if they are to act at all) (Bhaskar 1998, 601) 
Such a striving or teleological movement of actualising emergent causal 
powers is agential action and it is evident at physiological, social and cultural 
levels of human existence. Aristotle claims that exercising these faculties 
over time develops the virtues which are associated with the different parts 
of the soul. 
‘Virtue, too is divided into classes in accordance with this differentiation of the 
soul. Some virtues are called intellectual and others moral; wisdom and 
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understanding and prudence are intellectual, liberality and temperance are moral 
virtues’(Aristotle 1955, Nicomachean Ethics Book l 1103a4). 
According to MacIntyre, Aristotle’s teleology means ethical activity 
involves actualising our human possibilities: 
‘Within that teleological scheme there is a fundamental contrast between man-as-
he-happens to be and man-as-he-could be-if-he-realised-his-essential-nature. Ethics 
is the science which is to enable men to understand how they make the transition 
from the former state to the latter’ (Macintyre 2007, 52) 
Critical realists differentiate between the ‘actual’ powers of humans at any 
one time and the ‘real’ properties of humans which include the potential 
powers which could be developed under the right circumstances (Bhaskar 
and Hartwig 2010). It is through actualising such potential powers over time 
that people learn to use them judiciously hence developing the associated 
virtues. Humans have personal properties or capacities (Archer 2003), which 
have the potential to give rise to emergent powers in favourable 
circumstances. Such potentials allow us to actualise emergent powers and in 
the course of doing this people change their actual capacity to act further. 
This is a teleological process. Aristotle illustrates the point that humans have 
potentialities as well as actualised powers as follows: 
Again, of all those faculties with which nature endows us we first acquire the 
potentialities, and only later effect their actualization. (This is evident in the case of 
the senses. It was not from repeated acts of seeing or hearing that we acquired the 
senses but the other way round: we had these senses before we used them; we did 
not acquire them as the result of using them) (Aristotle 1955, NE Book ll 1103a28-
31).  
15 
 
Aristotle goes on to say that there are some powers which we learn to use 
by exercising them. The Aristotelian virtues of Justice and Temperance are 
two examples: 
But the virtues we do acquire by first exercising them, just as happens in the arts. 
Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it: people 
become builders by building and instrumentalists by playing instruments. Similarly 
we become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate ones, 
brave by performing brave ones. (Aristotle 1955, NE Book 11 1103a31-1103b-3) 
Therefore, it is the habitual practising of these powers to carry out virtuous 
acts – such as being just or courageous – that builds virtues. The virtue of 
courage when possessed means not only to be brave, but to know how to be 
brave at the right time and place and to the correct degree in different 
circumstances. Such understanding is developed over time, perhaps over an 
entire lifetime. For Aristotle the overall aim for man is happiness regardless 
of the whims of fortune and this can only be obtained through developing 
virtues, because living a virtuous life is in itself happiness: ‘It is virtuous 
activities that determine our happiness, and the opposite kind that produce 
the opposite effect’(Aristotle 1955, NE book1 1100b10). 
 But what are virtues? According to Aristotle they are neither emotions nor  
capacities – yet they are related to both. Aristotle distinguishes between 
feelings, faculties and dispositions and concludes that virtues are the latter. 
He writes: 
So if virtues are neither feelings nor faculties it remains that they are 
dispositions (Aristotle 1955, Book 11 1106a12) 
To illustrate, all humans have the capacity or faculty to feel anger. The way 
that we are disposed to feel anger could be either a virtue or a vice depending 
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on whether it tends towards being excessive, not enough or the right amount 
of anger in the appropriate circumstances. A virtuous person would be able 
to judge just how much and when, where and to what degree they should feel 
and exhibit anger. To gain the right disposition one would have to experience 
having exercised the virtues over time in different circumstances. Doing this 
and doing it correctly would develop the correct disposition or virtue. 
The circumstances in which one might be angry are highly contextual. When 
is it appropriate to get very angry and when is it necessary to keep calm? It 
is developing the disposition to ‘get it right’ in any particular case, which is 
virtuous. So Aristotelian virtues are the dispositions to exercise the correct 
capacities in the correct contexts and to the correct extent. The more a person 
practises these virtues, the more the virtues develop. Applying a virtues-
based approach to what is ‘excellence’ in teaching opens up a view of the 
complexity and richness involved in pedagogic interaction. It allows us to 
take account of the different contexts in which a teacher has to apply the 
many qualities needed at different times and to different degrees all of which 
vary with the particular physical, social, and cultural situations in which they 
work. 
Virtues and their nature 
Not only are virtues dispositions, but they must be fixed and permanent 
dispositions; and they must be undertaken as a matter of choice by a person 
who knows what they are about. Aristotle explains this further: 
But Virtuous acts are not done in a just or temperate way merely because they have 
a certain quality, but only if the agent also acts in a certain state, that is, (1) if he 
knows what he is doing, (2) if he chooses it, and chooses it for its own sake, and 
(3) if he does it from a fixed and permanent disposition. (NE book iv 1105a 26-
1105b) 
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Virtues are chosen for their own sake and for this reason do not sit well with 
acts imposed upon people by compulsion. One aspect of humans’ natural 
flourishing, as rational animals, is the ability to use reason to set goals for 
themselves. This means they are capable of envisaging goals, defining steps 
to follow and committing themselves to action. Actions can be undertaken 
both voluntarily and involuntarily. The extent of human agency is a complex 
issue, with various gradations of compliance where people may choose to 
act even when compelled. Aristotle discusses the question of how to decide 
if agents are acting voluntarily or not in more detail and depth than there is 
room for in this paper (Aristotle 1955, NE Book III section i 1109b-1111b) 
but there are limits to how someone can act virtuously under compulsion. 
In sum, Aristotelean virtues are dispositions which involve a telos to realise 
humans’ intrinsic potential. They are developed over time and in specific 
contexts and are pursued as a matter of choice. To be able to live the good 
or Eudemonic life, the path taken and hence the practices in which one 
engages are in keeping with man’s nature as a rational animal. 
It does not follow that engaging in a practice, such as teaching, will 
automatically develop virtues. They can also develop vices. Choices are 
always made about the practices in which we engage. People might do what 
they are told, or might only partially comply. Nevertheless, the practices we 
end up engaging in can be decisive in whether we develop virtues or vices. 
Aristotle uses the analogy of people learning music and artisans involved in 
crafts to make this point: 
Again, the causes or means that bring about any form of excellence are the same as 
those that destroy it, and similarly with art; for it is as a result of playing the harp 
that people become good and bad harpists. The same principle applies to builders 
and all other craftsmen. Men will become good builders as a result of building 
well, and bad ones as a result of building badly. Otherwise there would be no need 
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of anyone to teach them: they would all be born either good or bad. Now this holds 
good also of the virtues. It is the way that we behave in our dealings with other 
people that makes us just or unjust, and the way that we behave in the face of 
danger, accustoming ourselves to be timid or confident, that makes us brave or 
cowardly. (Aristotle 1955, NE Book 11 1103b8-17)  
So, according to Aristotle, simply being involved in a practice will not 
necessarily bring about improvement. If you were to spend your time 
building badly you would develop into a bad builder. It is not enough to 
become experienced in teaching in one’s discipline in particular contexts, it 
is important to do the judicious things many times to develop the virtues that 
will enable us to make the correct choices in each circumstance. Doing the 
wrong thing repeatedly can damage a teacher’s ability to act wisely in new 
contexts. The claim in this paper is that the effect of neo-liberal, metric based 
governance of teaching is encouraging those very practices that develop bad 
teaching. The next section examines the process in more detail. 
The virtues and pedagogy 
What does it mean to develop virtues during the process of living our lives 
and following our preoccupations and projects? The first stage is to envisage 
the steps within any practice undertaken and trust that the next stage on the 
trajectory towards this goal will become clearer. This is not as 
straightforward as it might seem. To be virtuous, in Aristotelean terms, is in 
keeping with, and a part of, the ability to flourish. This is in contrast with 
Kant who saw being virtuous as a struggle against inclinations and needs and 
in accordance with duty: 
‘…we will put before ourselves the concept of duty, which contains that of a good 
will, though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, 
far from concealing it and making it unrecognizable, rather elevate it by contrast 
and let it shine forth all the more brightly’(Kant 1964, 65). 
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Such deontological approaches also appear in calls for self-sacrifice for some 
greater good. Similarly, ideas stemming from utilitarian perspectives that 
measure ‘good’ as the greatest benefit for the greatest number call for giving 
up our own flourishing for the sake of others. After all, is not the social 
contract about the giving up of our sovereignty for the sake of the benefits 
(Rousseau 1998 [1762], Locke 2003 [1690]) that come from living in a 
society? These ideas are familiar and well justified. We are accustomed to 
accepting that our personal projects, built upon deeply held values, might 
have to be given up for a greater good. It can be argued that similar plausible 
and powerful approaches to self-sacrifice justify faculty acquiescence to 
metric-based pedagogical practices. Specifically, it seems likely that faculty 
can be persuaded to  conform to the idea that, in judging teaching, one should 
defer to the university’s preoccupation with high scores on empiricist metrics 
(Frankham 2017). This is in the belief that without such high scores the 
department, module or programme would not be viable. Faculty worry that 
if the university fails there will be negative consequences at many levels, 
from less access to education for students to job losses for colleagues, 
perhaps themselves. Thus persuaded, faculty can find themselves 
uncritically following managerial prescriptions; succumbing to pressures 
which direct practices in ways detrimental to richer pedagogical endeavours 
and often detrimental to students’ intellectual development (Burrows 2012). 
MacIntyre claims that amongst what he calls the ‘central moral fictions of 
our age’ is the ‘peculiarly managerial fiction embodied in the claim to 
possess systematic effectiveness in controlling certain aspects of social 
reality’. And he goes on to point out that effectiveness is not ‘a morally 
neutral value’. Rather it is ‘inseparable from a mode of human existence in 
which the contrivance of means is in central part the manipulation of human 
beings into compliant patterns of behaviour’ (Macintyre 2007, 74). 
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Within such manipulative frameworks the agent must choose to negotiate a 
path towards pedagogic aims, the correct formulation of which will result in 
developing various virtues in line with her internal development as a human 
and her professional practice as a teacher. 
Aristotle claimed, in the Eudemian Ethics, that: ‘It is the correctness of the 
end of the purposive choice of which virtue is the cause’ (Aristotle, cited in 
Macintyre (2007, 149). Within the university context, it is essential to learn 
how to set such ends correctly. Yet this very basic task is being taken from 
faculty when the decisions about evaluating what is deemed ‘teaching 
excellence’ are decided by managers with an eye to market considerations, 
and monitored against vague frameworks of ‘teaching excellence’. The goal 
is decided, and a trajectory set, with aims which – because they are 
preoccupied by markets and metrics – are often far from the actual 
pedagogical needs of the students within specific disciplines and contexts. 
Lecturers engage in repeated activity on a regular basis, but are they 
developing virtues or vices? This process was initially outlined by Shore and 
Wright who pointed out that new categories of ‘experts’ appear who: 
‘First design new types of ‘expert knowledge’ that provided the classifications for 
the new normative grid. Second, they advised on the design of institutional 
procedures. Third, they staffed and presided over the new regulatory mechanisms 
and systems, and judged adherence to or deviance from them. Fourth, they had a 
redemptive role in so far as they made their expert knowledge available to 
individuals who wished to engage in the process of self-improvement in order to 
modify their conduct according to the desired norms’ (1999, 560). 
Requiring people to perform activities which set them on a slightly different 
trajectory to pedagogical goals can manipulate them to shift those goals. 
Enforcement of the latest version of prescriptive ‘teaching excellence’ 
metrics makes faculty accommodate aims other than meeting the learning 
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needs of their students; the development of disciplinary aims and indeed their 
own physical, social and cultural needs. Whether one agrees or not with the 
new prescriptions is largely irrelevant, one has to comply nonetheless, and 
the very act of compliance begins to develop different qualities such as 
‘minding one’s back’ or working to entertain students. The development of 
such qualities requires the cultivation of very different skills or potentials; 
ones that encapsulate what Shore and Wright (1999) have called the 
marketized and marketizing self. Under such conditions working to the 
metric can lead to habitual action justified by the belief that there is no 
alternative (TINA). Such TINA formations are dangerous in their ability to 
suppress normal pedagogical interactions. 
I have described such processes elsewhere (Sharar 2016) and use some of 
my research participants’ accounts here to illustrate them. Sociology lecturer 
Sam Lewis describes the pressure to make things easy for students, 
reconceptualised as paying clients, saying: 
‘…the idea that you can deliver the curriculum, the idea that somehow you 
could deliver learning to people is just a fallacy… I think it’s related to the 
idea of students as customers’. Sam goes on to describe changing student 
expectations saying they feel that: 
‘somehow you can tell them exactly what is required to produce a good answer to 
this . . . assignment and you can’t do that because a lot of it is tacit knowledge . . . 
and skill, it’s being able to know what would be relevant, to know how to 
formulate something, how to write it and I think that we shouldn’t give the students 
the impression that somehow we can get them over that hurdle’. (Sharar 2016, 108)  
There are two reasons why performativity under such regimes prevents the 
lecturers gaining virtues. The first is because of the connection between 
living a virtuous life and flourishing. The following accounts give an insight 
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into the distress faculty can face. Teacher educator Anne, collaborating with 
a colleague faced with reduced teaching spaces and resources, said: 
The first thing I knew was when Mary came to me looking . . . not looking like 
Mary at all . . . looking worried . . . upset. Looking like she had not had a good 
night’s sleep (Sharar 2016, 134). 
Law lecturer Jim Hope describes strategies used by colleagues in despair at 
changes in their faculty thus: 
We try and look after each other. . . . We look at . . . what can we do? What can we 
have a go at? What’s a good thing? What is a bad thing? What are we trying to do? 
Mike and Michelle and Anne and myself, we try to put things on and say ‘look this 
is available here and there’ (Sharar 2016, 158). 
Commenting further that: 
Stress is . . . there’s an awful number of people going off with stress for a week, 
two weeks at a time. . and of course the sickness rate has gone up (Sharar 2016, 
158). 
The second way in which the practice of pedagogy is being impaired is 
through a reduced ability to know what one is doing, to choose what to do 
for its own sake and doing it from a fixed and permanent disposition. In 
effect this is a reduced ability to develop a virtuous approach. Lecturers learn 
to act with just the right amount of wisdom, courage, liberality, magnanimity 
and amiability within their complex, disciplinary and context-ridden 
interactions with students. Aristotelean virtues are, in themselves, important 
in learning how to make tacit decisions in areas of pedagogic practice. The 
following quote is by law lecturer Jim Hope, whose department replaced 
face-to-face lectures with pre-recorded on-line lectures to ensure that they 
scored highly on technology targets. He stated: 
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‘…our main complaint about this is not whether or not the students particularly like 
it or not, some do some don’t . . . it’s the fact that we can’t see what they are doing, 
and as you know yourself, in a live lecture. . . . ‘They don’t get that . . .’ ‘let me go 
through that again’ . . . ‘I need to go slower’ . . . ‘no, they haven’t quite grasped . . . 
let’s go a different way round’ . . . and of course you can’t do that and so you just 
end up just giving all this stuff out’ Jim cited in Sharar (2016, 153). 
Jim is highlighting that the levels of tacit knowledge and the development 
of practical wisdom involved in teaching are rich and complex, particularly 
in a rapidly changing educational system, where both the nature of the 
students’ past experiences and the circumstances in which teaching occurs 
are becoming less predictable than in the past. 
In the following section, I will offer an alternative to the metrics-based 
approach to teaching. This is based on MacIntyre’s adaptation of the 
concept of Aristotelian virtues to modern human practices. 
Pedagogy as a practice: MacIntyre’s approach: 
MacIntyre argues that across societies and over time, conceptions of what is 
virtuous have differed. He develops a virtue-based approach within human 
practices defining a practice as: 
Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to and 
partially definitive of that form of activity with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved are 
systematically extended (Macintyre 2007, 187) 
Teaching in higher education is therefore a practice, but it is one under 
pressure. Evaluation of what is deemed good, is done in the light of the aims 
and practical wisdom already developed by experts within the practice. 
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According to MacIntyre’s social constructivist approach, novices develop 
what he calls internal goods as they engage in the particular practice with 
more experienced others. He offers the following tentative definition of 
virtue within a practice: 
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends 
to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of 
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.(Macintyre 2007, 
191) 
MacIntyre ties notions of ‘good’ to the aims of the practice. What is deemed 
to be good is what helps one in developing one’s practice as a carpenter for 
example and doing the things that more experienced practitioners have 
already designated as useful will allow agents to conduct themselves wisely 
in the roles they have taken up within that practice. MacIntyre is extending 
Aristotle’s idea of virtue ethics to the qualities one needs to develop when 
entering a practice. This process of practising virtue, using qualities useful 
for the success of the practice, is connected the development of human 
personal properties or capacities in the physical, social and cultural spheres. 
Such properties grow as one practises the qualities needed to fulfil one’s role 
by gaining new abilities, and in the process, learning to discern the best way 
to use those abilities. MacIntyre also points out that there are some goods 
within a practice – which he calls ‘internal goods’ – which cannot be gained 
without engaging in that practice and that there is a constant process of 
evaluating one’s self against the values of the practice. Such evaluation 
requires ‘the virtues of justice, courage and honesty’(Macintyre 2007, 191). 
In current conditions it is this aspect of the internal goods of the practice of 
pedagogy in higher education which are undermined by performativity, 
which require people to give up deeply held professional values and assume 
a marketized persona. 
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What are the implications of this for the practice of pedagogy in higher 
education? Alignment between the qualities it is hoped students will acquire 
and the experiences organised in the curriculum is always needed if students 
are to learn. Consider the virtue of prudence or practical wisdom about which 
Aristotle says: 
Well, it is thought to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate rightly 
about what is good and advantageous for himself; not in particular respects…..but 
what is conducive to the good life generally. A sign of this is the fact that we call 
people prudent in particular respects when they have calculated successfully with a 
view to some serious end (Aristotle 1955, NE Book VI  1140a 25-32). 
Both teachers and students need the virtue of prudence, or practical wisdom. 
The lecturer develops prudence through deliberations about, for example, 
what to present, how to structure the content, how to adapt the level to the 
particular students, and how to interact with the physical and resource 
contexts. The students develop prudence – practical wisdom – through 
negotiating the many discipline-related practical decisions that are involved 
in the field that they are entering. They could be supported in their 
development of prudence through participating in a carefully considered 
curriculum, designed by a virtuous lecturer. MacIntyre’s approach to the 
development of virtue on a daily basis in order to live the good life, in terms 
of the internal development of lecturers and students, would suggest the 
following set of requirements: defining those qualities that the teacher needs 
in order to create ways of making the concepts accessible; organising the 
curriculum in terms of stages and time; negotiating the affordances and 
constraints of all the physical, social and discursive structures in which the 
learning is to take place; and, through practice, gaining an ability to do all 
this prudently. Following MacIntyre then the question for any pedagogical 
project becomes: What are the acquired human qualities that the lecturer 
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needs to develop and practice, in the best way, in the best place, at the best 
time and to just the right degree, in order for the students to learn? 
Once identified these are the qualities that to be practised to become virtuous, 
as a teacher in higher education. They may include qualities like the ability 
to observe and to sense the problems that students are facing in their work. 
Such sensitivity can only be developed over time through practising such 
observations. A lecturer needs to be able to identify activities that assist 
students to overcome the blocks and barriers to learning as they arise. 
Another lecturer might develop an approachability over time, so that students 
feel comfortable sharing their weaknesses and worries. The emergent clarity 
about the order in which to present ideas and the extent to which students 
participate in finding out for themselves, results from such capacities being 
exercised habitually. Judgements are made about the creative use of physical 
spaces and resources, of social roles and relationships and of symbolic 
resources particular to the disciplinary context. An experienced teacher may 
develop the ability to discern these and blend them so as to meet particular 
student needs in a variety of contexts. These are all just examples of qualities 
that can be developed in the course of pedagogic practice and each specific 
context will give rise to different ones. The objectives differ, as do the 
contexts. Such qualities would build up to constitute, for the lecturer, a level 
of practical wisdom or prudence to understand what the students need in 
order to flourish and act judiciously in a variety of rapidly changing 
circumstances.  
Qualities that students could develop can also be outlined, in each particular 
context and for each particular discipline. Examples may be: a disposition to 
work together collaboratively; the confidence to engage in critical dialogue; 
the courage to eventually be able to critique the pedagogic authority and 
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attain a level of independence; the ability to reformulate knowledge gained; 
and the courage to use it to follow one’s own trajectory in life. These are all 
possible examples of qualities that students could develop through a virtues-
based approach to curriculum. They may be thought of as the virtue of 
prudence or practical wisdom about the practice of learning as a student. 
Such qualities take time to form and strengthen and need to be practised 
regularly. Students can be enabled to experience situations where their 
capacities are exercised. Such a curriculum can be articulated as a set of 
experiences rather than lists of facts fitted around some tightly articulated 
learning objectives chosen for their convenience as measureable metrics for 
managerial purposes (Broadbent 2007). 
Structures that facilitate pedagogy in its richness and complexity are needed, 
while those already in existence must be protected. What are the structures 
that will develop the virtue of friendly comradeship amongst our students? 
What are the pedagogic techniques? The spaces? The discourses? Which of 
the needs of our students are not being met by the current situation and what 
are we and they to do about it? What are the barriers to our being able to 
carry out our teaching roles? Effective pedagogy in current contexts needs 
structures that will nurture it. But the atmosphere of marketization and 
performativity prevalent in higher education in England is not conducive to 
building such structures. The next section is about possible ways to 
approaching agential change. 
A possible way forward. 
Critical Realism offers a number of ways of approaching emancipatory 
agential change. The Transformative Model for Social Action (Bhaskar 
1993) outlines one way of analysing the situation and making changes. The 
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Capability Approach, used within a Critical Realist framework (Tao 2013, 
Bhaskar 2016), is another. Archer’s morphogenetic approach to structure-
agency interactions (Archer 1998, 2007b, 2010) has proved particularly 
useful as an analytical approach to pedagogical projects in England (Sharar 
2016). This is because of its clear analytical separation between social 
structures and agency which allows a study of the interplay between 
structures and agency. In refusing to conflate structures and agency Archer 
allows a study of the precise interactions between the activities of rational 
human beings, to actualise their potential, and the constraining or enabling 
structures in which they find themselves. In the following section a possible 
approach is outlined and illustrated with the anonymised accounts of my 
research participants (Sharar 2016), who were lecturers working in higher 
education in England. 
First the particular qualities needed by students and lecturers have to be 
identified in order to be able to scope such pedagogical projects. This 
involves a break from a passive acceptance of the situation as a TINA (There 
is no alternative) formation, and engaging instead in a reflexive analysis of 
what is going on. As Archer puts it: 
Reflexivity depends upon a subject who has sufficient personal identity to know 
what he or she cares about and to design the ‘projects’ that they hope (fallibly) will 
realise their concerns within society. Equally, it depends upon the objectivity of 
their social circumstances which, under their own (fallible) descriptions, will 
encourage them to follow one course of action rather than another. Deliberation 
consists in people evaluating their situations in the light of their concerns and 
evaluating their projects (Archer 2007a, 34). 
This is what teacher educator Ann did when faced with diminishing 
resources. Here Ann explains the qualities her students could develop:  
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… not just subject knowledge, it is not all in the head but approaches, attitudes, 
values need to be got right at the very beginning … my concentration is on the 
process rather than the actual tasks for which there is in fact no right or wrong way 
… all this about learning aims is less important than for the students to learn how 
Ann cited in Sharar (2016, 136). 
Nicola says that Geology students: 
… collect information and share it…. do the far more abstract thinking, linking 
together, synthesising information, bringing it into the big picture…. Need to be 
collaborating at key points for . . . hypothesis generation… and develop… a whole 
set of different reflective learning processes Nicola cited in Sharar (2016, 95). 
Sam suggests that in sociology:  
…one of the problems is going to be for students to work out what the line is, and 
what can you be critical about and what you can’t be critical about, what counts as 
critical and what doesn’t. Sam cited in Sharar (2016, 110). 
Jim considers the different practices the law students should develop: 
…So you would not be trying to persuade a jury. . . . A different set of skills are 
required for that. . . . You are trying to argue the finer points of law with a judge 
and against opposition. Jim cited in Sharar (2016, 148). 
The analysis also covers faculty. Margaret considers a range of qualities that 
lecturers in Zoology must learn saying: 
…if you are a PhD student or a post-doc, you know a lot about one subject but 
have you had the experience . . . when you’re at the university you are rubbing 
shoulders with people from different disciplines all the time so you are challenged. 
You should have a broad view even if you don’t agree. But have you got that at the 
teaching level? No it takes time . . . you acquire these skills. . . . You don’t have 
them to start with. Margaret cited in Sharar (2016, 182).  
Furthermore, in setting tasks for students Margaret elaborates further: 
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…you have to decide on a question, furnish it with reading material. It is highly 
contextual. What for? What’s the purpose? I mean you ask a question, it’s not the 
only question you can ask. It’s certainly not comprehensive, so what’s the point? 
What does that particular question elicit? It’s got to be broad and also detailed. It’s 
got to be answerable in five or six or ten different ways by the students. Margaret 
cited in Sharar (2016, 183). 
These accounts illustrate the richness and depth of pedagogy in universities. 
They also illustrate the impossibility of attempting to reduce it to metrics. 
The qualities needed for both students and lecturers, once analysed, clarify 
the approaches to pedagogy needed. Reflecting on what is currently absent 
in the context one in which one is trying to work highlights what might be 
done in specific situations. 
The second step is an analysis of morphogenesis in the interaction between 
structures constraining such pedagogy and lecturers’ agency. The structures 
within which humans find ourselves are constantly shifting. Constraining 
and enabling structures can be identified as well as the mechanisms that are 
generating them. This step involves paying attention to specific disciplinary 
and contextual considerations. In this Archer’s definition of reflexivity as: 
‘an individual reflecting about herself in relation to her circumstances and 
vice versa’. (Archer 2007a, 58) is realised. 
As an example of a constraint facing him Sam points out:  
The pressure is now, something that I try to resist…for providing students with a 
lot of information for what a good answer would be, what this question is asking 
for . . . writing outlines for the students of what would be a good answer. . . . And 
the reason I’ve resisted it is because it gets to the point where there’s no point in 
having the assignment really Sam cited in Sharar (2016, 112). 
Third, reflexive deliberation is needed throughout the life of the project. 
Lecturers engage in looking out for possibilities to make changes to the 
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structures themselves. Through the process of making changes within the 
bounds of real possibilities, people change themselves and those around 
them in ways that develop more opportunities. The changes made to 
themselves in the process constitute new personal properties which they can 
bring to bear upon new situations in the new structural environment (Archer 
2007a) . Whenever this is done these properties interact with the structures 
around the agent finds herself equipped with personal emergent powers 
which are comparable with MacIntyre’s (2007, 191) ‘acquired human 
qualities’ which can enhance her agency. This stage involves an analysis of 
possible openings in existing constraining structures for things to be changed 
through action; what can be realistically changed; and what new pedagogical 
possibilities could be created as a result? Fourth, action is taken on the basis 
of such an analysis and the new situation analysed again both during the 
action and after it.  
Taking advantage of the new technology structures they were asked to use, 
Jim and a colleague turned it to their advantage: 
Susan and I did a video . . . about how not to present . . . and we . . . simply got a 
script which was dire . . . true to life . . . we did ten minutes . . . literally . . . took a 
film of ourselves fidgeting . . . picking at our nails . . . rattling jewellery . . . going’ 
. . . uhmmm . . .’. Ten minutes . . . and it turned out to be a real hit with students. . . 
. I mean it really made a difference. Jim cited in (Sharar 2016, 149). 
Nicola developed a project which: 
….actually fitted with those, ticking the boxes nicely because it’s what [University 
X] wants to do, they want to innovate, they want to move things forward. It also 
ticked another box, that they were worried about the cost of residentials and field-
trips. I played that card (Sharar 2016, 98). 
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In each case, a space is found within the existing structures to unlock the 
potential for new pedagogical activities. In the course of creating such 
spaces, the constraining structures themselves can be changed and far from 
simply acting superficially in order to run after scores, faculty has the 
possibility of exercising some of the qualities that will allow them to develop 
the particular practical wisdom or Aristotelian virtue of prudence involved 
in teaching in the varied and fast changing landscape that exists in higher 
education in England. 
In conclusion, in a marketized higher education sector, where faculty are 
under pressure of performativity regimes, many feel stuck within a TINA 
formation. However, rather than allowing themselves to be passive agents, it 
is possible for them to take an Aristotelian virtue ethics approach to develop 
the qualities needed to carry through pedagogical aspirations. Such strategies 
involve an active and careful reflexive analysis of the structures that 
constrain, seeking potential spaces within existing structures which can be 
opened out further by action and structural elaboration. In this way it is 
possible to start to actualize the potential in pedagogical interactions in ways 
that could create new structures and new possibilities. 
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